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I. INTRODUCTION
When I was very young and impressionable (about nine) there
was a feral cat in the neighborhood who gave birth to four scrawny
kittens, although she did not look much bigger than a kitten herself
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
* Visiting Professor, Hofstra University School of Law. I am deeply grateful
to Professor Lucy McGough and the Louisiana Law Review for inviting me to
participate in this Symposium and to the other panelists for their illuminating
presentations and very helpful comments. Patricia Kasting, reference law librarian
at Hofstra, provided invaluable research assistance.
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Her nest was in the recess of a basement window of the garden
apartment where we lived. A day or two later, there was a terrible
storm and I ran home from school to see the kittens mewling in the
rising water as their mother howled, distraught and clueless, nearby.
After quite a bit of mewling and howling on my part, my mother
agreed to let me bring them in the house. We could not catch the
mother, but we placed the kittens on a folded piece of flannel in a
basket, put them near a warm radiator, and tried to feed them with a
dropper. They all died within twenty-four hours. Years later, a
friend at college had a cat who had kittens and i saw what a mother
cat actually did. It was only then that I realized that, without the
mother, those earlier kittens had not had much of a chance.
This conference is grounded in a similarly deep, primal, intuitive
understanding. We realize the terrible vulnerability of children. We
realize that, in general, parents are their best hope for survival or, less
melodramatically, for a decent life. These are dangerous times and
we live in a dangerous world. It is the job of parents to protect their
children from drugs, violence, disease, hunger, and child molesters,
to provide them with nutritious meals and adequate healthcare.
Divorce often makes this job harder. Since it takes a parent out
of the home, and often takes everyone out of the home, it reduces the
number of on-site adults available to protect the child from whatever
dangers are out there. At the same time, divorce may well increase
the child's potential exposure to the storms of economic need as well
as the predictable traumas of divorce itself, including anger, guilt,
and emotional loss. As recent studies confirm, American children are
increasingly at risk. Thus, a Symposium focusing on the protection
of children is important and timely and I would like to thank
Professor Lucy McGough, Alison Cain, and the Louisiana Law
Review for inviting me to participate.
But like an ungrateful cur, to mix metaphors, in this paper I bite
(or at least snap at) the hand that feeds me. "Divorce Reform for the
Protection of Children" contains three premises that I would like to
challenge. First, it tacitly assumes that divorce reform can protect
"children" in general, rather than a relatively small, and quite
demographically distinct, population of children in particular.
Second, it assumes that divorce itself poses a danger to these
children. Third, it assumes that the law should step in to avert, or at
least manage that danger. This paper interrogates each of these
propositions.
My project may strike some as painfully obvious. Of course there
are bigger, broader threats to American children, but this conference
is not about the top five threats to American children; it is about
divorce. Surely we can make divorce less difficult and less painful
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for children and surely that is worth doing. There is an impressive
assembly of brainpower in this Symposium devoted to precisely that.
But my thesis here is that first, there are built-in costs and built-in
limits to this particular approach. Second, both can be constructively
addressed by re-situating the discussion of the protection of children
in the broader rhetorical framework of human rights law.
This paper is divided into four parts. First, I want to ask, "Protect
which children?" My second question is, "From what?" The third
question is, "Is this a job for law?" Finally, drawing on the answers
to these questions, I propose an alternative framework that protects
more children, at greater risk of graver dangers, within a well-
established legal framework. Specifically, any discussion of the
protection of children should be situated in the broader context of
international human rights law, starting with the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (hereafter the "Children's Convention" or
"CRC"). 1
11. PROTECT WHICH CHILDREN?
As Jacobus tenBroek noted forty years ago, there are two
systems of family law in America, one for the rich and one for the
poor.2 Divorce is primarily for the former, welfare laws are entirely
for the latter. This has not changed. As my colleague John Gregory
recently noted in commenting on the ALl Principles on Family
Dissolution, "They should be called 'the ALl Principles for the Rich
and Famous." 3
Situating the "protection of children" in the context of divorce
assumes a pre-tenBroek world that fails to recognize that divide.4
By doing so, it begins by leaving out the most vulnerable
children-those with no parent to protect them, including children
in the foster care system. More than 125,000 children in foster care
are waiting for permanent placements.5 By omitting these children,
1. United Nations: Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1448.
2. See Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System ofFamily Law: Its Origin,
Development, and Present Status, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 614 (1965); California's Dual
System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development and Present Status, 16 Stan. L.
Rev. 900 (1964).
3. John Gregory, Remarks at Workshop on ALl Principles, Harvard Law
School, Oct. 2004.
4. This is movingly expressed in the photos of Ralph Eugene Meatyard,
currently on exhibit at the International Center for Photography in New York.
While Meatyard memorably captured an edgier side of childhood (in a series of
children wearing grotesque masks, for example), many of his photos convey a
mythic innocence, sweet but not sentimental.
5. Press Release, Children's Defense Fund, The State of America's Children
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moreover, the damage caused by the foster care system itself is
ignored. As Dorothy Roberts has recently pointed out, children of
color are vastly overrepresented in this system.6 Black children
comprise roughly one-fifth of the population, but two-fifths of the
children in foster care.7 Children of color comprise one-third of the
population, but sixty percent of the children in foster care.8
Professor Roberts cites sociologist Robert Hill for similar data on
Native American children.9 Roberts painstakingly documents not
only the devastating impact of the removal of these children on the
children themselves, but on the communities they leave behind.'0
This includes, of course, the children in those communities who are
not removed, but learn that being taken away by strangers from your
family and your home is always a possibility.
In addition, situating the "protection" of children in the context
of divorce leaves out the growing number of children unlikely to
ever be affected by divorce because their parents are not married.
Currently, approximately thirty percent of American children are in
this category." These children are disproportionately poor,
compared both to children in general and to children of divorce in
particular. Thus, they are in greater need of protection from the
risks posed by poverty, which, as discussed below, are among the
most serious risks confronting American children.
III. FROM WHAT?
This Part analyzes the real risks affecting American children.
Children are in danger. There is a storm, but it is neither caused by
divorce nor limited to children of divorce. In fact, focusing on those
children not only erases most of the children at grave risk in this
country, but also distorts our basic understanding of those risks.
A. Risks Facing American Children
2004: A Continuing Portrait of Inequality Fifty Years After Brown v. Board of
Education (July 13, 2004), available at http://www.childrensdefense.
org/pressrelease/040713.aspx.
6. Dorothy Roberts, Siben Lecture: The Community Dimension of State
Child Protection, Hofstra Law School (April 6, 2005).
7. Id.
8. See generally Donald N. Duquette et al., We Know Better than We Do: A
Policy Framework for Child Welfare Reform, 31 U. Mich. J.L. Reform. 93, 95
(1997).
9. Roberts, supra note 6.
10. Id.
11. Douglas E. Abrams & Sarah H. Ramsey, Children and the Law-Doctrine,
Policy, and Practice, 128 (2nd ed. 2002).
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1. Poverty
As Abraham Maslow noted decades ago, the satisfaction of basic
needs-food, shelter, healthcare-is necessarily the first priority.'2 It
is only after these basic needs are met that we can function as
productive, contributing members of society. The impact of poverty
on children may be particularly damaging, physically as well as
psychologically, because it impedes or precludes normal development.
The earlier a child falls behind, the harder it will be for her to ever
catch up. James Heckman, the Nobel prize-winning economist,
suggests that if disadvantaged children fail to acquire life skills at an
early age, it becomes increasingly difficult for them to do so.' 3
Poverty affects every aspect of a child's life and its impact in one
area, such as substandard housing, is likely to exacerbate its impact in
another, such as health.'4 The examples provided below, accordingly,
are merely intended to serve as illustrations. There are many other
indicia of children's well-being affected by poverty, such as literacy,
hunger, and access to mental health care. The multiple consequences
of poverty interact with each other and are cumulative. Thus, the
effects, such as poor performance in school, are over- determined and
often resistant to piecemeal reform.
a. Health
Although the United States boasts some of the best hospitals,
research centers, and medical specialists in the world, it falls below
most of the other industrialized democracies in terms of providing
healthcare for the poor. The evisceration of social safety nets through
"the end of welfare as we know it" in the mid-nineties' and the Bush
12. Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (1970) (Maslow's "hierarchy
of needs" begins with "physiological" and progresses through safety, love, esteem,
and self-actualization).
13. See, e.g., Stepehen J. Dubner, Toward a Unified Theory ofBlackAmerica,
N.Y. Times Magazine, Mar. 20, 2005, at 54, 58. Heckman's notable, albeit
technical, works include: James Heckman, Lecture Notes on Longitudinal Data
Analysis (1997) and a monograph, Understanding the Contribution ofLegislation,
Social Activism, Markets and Choice to the Economic Progress of African
Americans in the Twentieth Century (2001).
14. See generally Children and Poverty, 7 Future of Children 8-9 et passim
(Summer/Fall 1997).
15. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
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administration's relentless campaign against social welfare programs 16has deepened the crisis, as shown in Table 1, Appendix A.
b. Education
The impact of poverty on education is similarly well-documented,
as shown in Table 2, Appendix A.' 8
Some neoconservatives have argued that the relationship between
poverty and low educational achievement is one of correlation rather
than causality; i.e., that low native intelligence roduces both 9
Although these arguments have been refuted repeatedly, and rejected
by educators, the Bush administration has refused to provide the
resources needed to upgrade schools in low-income areas. Instead,
the Administration crafted the infamous "No Child Left Behind"
policy, linking school funding to annual performance reviews which
rely heavily on student test scores.20 The net result, as critics have
pointed out, is that schools in low-income areas are under pressure to
keep children in the same grade year after year. 1 In fact, American
public schools are widely regarded as failures, with the exception of
those in affluent suburbs and a few, highly competitive, magnet
schools. The rich and upper middle class send their children to
private schools.22 The not-so-rich and the poor home school their
children or send them to Charter schools.23
16. See, e.g., Correspondents Report: Bush Embarks on Ambitious Social
Welfare Reform (Feb. 6, 2005), available at http://www.abc.net.au/
correspondents/content/2004/s1296568.htm (describing the President's plan to
privatize social security).
17. Children's Defense Fund, Defining Poverty and Why It Matters For
Children (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.childrensdefense.org/
familyincome/childpoverty/definingpoverty.
18. Id.
19. Richard Hemstein & Charles Murray, The Bell Curve (Free Press 1994).
20. Barbara Mantel, No ChildLeft Behind: The Issues, 15 CQ Researcher 469
(2005).
21. Monica Davey, A Child Left Behind, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 2005. at 4A.
"No Child Left Behind" has inspired considerable academic commentary, most of
it negative. See, e.g., Sarah D. Greenberger, Comment, Enforceable Rights, No
ChildLeft Behind, andPolitical Patriotism: A Casefor Open-minded Section 1983
Jurisprudence, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1011 (2005); James E. Ryan, The Perverse
Incentives of the No ChildLeft BehindAct, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 932 (2004); Melanie
Natasha Henry, Comment, No Child Left Behind? Educational Malpractice
Litigation for the 21st Century, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1117 (2004). But see Amy M.
Reichbach, Note, The Power Behind the Promise: Enforcing No Child Left Behind
to Improve Education, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 667 (2004).
22. Letting Parents Decide, Washington Post, June 28, 2002, at A28.
23. Norman Draper, New Frontier for Charter Schools: Once Mainly Urban
or Rural, More Are Opening in Twin Cities Suburbs andAttracting Students From
Other Schools, Star Tribune, September 5, 2004.
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2. Juvenile Justice
The juvenile justice system, like the foster care system, is an
example of the way in which the absence of a focus on children's
rights harms poor children. It also suggests that arguments about the
lack of resources might better be focused on the misuse of resources.
As in the foster care system, enormous sums are being expended
counterproductively. Instead of serving the needs of children, the
juvenile justice system dehumanizes them. The children most at risk,
and who arguably pose the most serious risk to society,24 are treated
like adult criminals, rather than like troubled children.25 This is not
to trivialize either the gravity of some of their offenses, or the
violence in their lives. According to the Children's Defense Fund:
[T]he national crime rate has dropped nearly 25 percent since
1993, but more than one quarter of violent crime victims
known to police in the U.S. are juveniles. Youth ages 16 to 19
currently experience overall violence, including rape and
general assault, at higher rates than people in all other age
categories.
26
The point is simply that if the project is the "protection of
children," this may well be a more urgent site for intervention than
divorce.
B. Risks Facing American Children of Divorce
The focus here shifts to behavioral problems. According to
Professor Robert Hughes of Ohio State:
On the one hand, the majority of children from divorced
families did not have serious problems requiring professional
help. On the other hand, a larger percentage of children from
divorced families than intact families did have serious
problems. Another way to say this is that most children in
24. Adele Bernhard, who directs the criminal clinic at Pace University,
suggests that the risk posed by these children is overestimated. She points out that
many of them are charged with committing acts, such as possession of drugs and
intoxication, that their suburban counterparts engage in with impunity, in the
privacy of their suburban homes. Interview with Adele Bernhard, Associate
Professor of Law, Pace Law School, in Hempstead, N.Y. (Feb. 23, 2005).
25. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hafemeister, Parameters and Implementation of a
Right to Mental Health Treatment for Juvenile Offenders, 12 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y &
L. 61 (2004). See generally Conference, Beyond These Walls: Promoting Health
and Human Rights in Juvenile Justice, New York City (Apr. 30, 2005).
26. Children's Defense Fund, supra note 5.
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divorced families do not need help, but more children in this
group than in intact families are likely to need help.27
More specifically, Professor Hughes notes:
90% of adolescent boys and girls in intact families were
within the normal range on [behavioral] problems and 10%
had serious problems that would generally require some type
of help. The percentages for divorced families were 74% of
the boys and 66% of the girls in the normal range and 26% of
the boys and 34% of the girls were in the problematic range.28
Assuming for the purposes of argument that these "serious
problems" can be effectively addressed by existing programs or
treatment regimes, the question remains: why focus on children of
divorce? Is the assumption that parents in intact families have greater
access to such programs or regimes? If so, an alternative response
might be to assure such access to children in divorced families. It
cannot be assumed that divorce is the exclusive cause of such
problems, since such problems also occur in intact families. Nor can
it be assumed that divorce causes the incremental increase, since it
may in fact be the other way around; that is, children with serious
problems can impose strains on families that may cause some couples
to separate.
Finally, and crucially, where is the data on children with "serious
problems" in single parent families, never-married families, or in
families without parents, including the burgeoning number of
children being raised by grandparents?29 These questions may be
naive, and expose a fundamental ignorance of empirical
methodologies. At the same time, any normative project that begins
with the exclusion of the most vulnerable must be questioned, and
justified.
IV. THE ROLE OF LAW
Law for the protection of children may be usefully conceptualized
as functioning along a rough continuum. This reflects a range of
views on the role of the State in protecting children, from least
interventionist, to more pro-active, to micro-managing, as shown
below.
27. Robert Hughes, Jr., The Effects of Divorce on Children, (1996) available
at http://www.hec.ohio-state.edu.famlife/divorce/index.htm.
28. Id. (citing findings of Mavis Hetherington (1993)).
29. The anecdotal accounts are sobering. See, e.g., Shaila K. Dewan, Parents
of Mentally Ill Children Trade Custody for Care, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 2003, at 35
(describing parents who relinquished custody of their children in order to obtain
treatment for them).
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The Role of the Law
negative positive changing hearts and minds
(micro-managing)
"Least interventionist" refers to negative rights, freedom from
State intervention. Negative rights are firmly enshrined in American
Constitutional jurisprudence, which prohibits State establishment of
religion or State restriction of free speech. The more "pro-active"
view refers to positive rights, imposing affirmative obligations on
States to assure the basic needs of its people. Positive rights have
never established a foothold in American jurisprudence,30 although
broad-based support for certain economic rights, such as Medicare
and Social Security, has not eroded.3 This is confirmed by the
continuing resistance to President Bush's recent campaign to
privatize Social Security.32 The final category, changing hearts and
minds, draws on a long and vigorous tradition of American optimism
and belief in our capacity to reinvent ourselves, a tradition that has
itself been transformed and renewed in the context of post-divorce
parenting since the no-fault divorce revolution of the 1970s.33
30. In part, this hostility can be attributed to the rhetoric of opportunity, the
rhetoric of the "American Dream." Barbara Stark, Postmodern Rhetoric, Economic
Rights and an International Text: "A Miraclefor Breakfast ", 33 Va. J. Int'l L. 433,
438 (1993). In part, it can be attributed to the Cold War, to what Professor Henkin
has referred to as the "blind confusion of ideological communism . . . with
commitment to the welfare of individual human beings . . . ." Louis Henkin,
Preface to Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century, (Louis Henkin & John
Lawerence Hargrove eds. 1994). See generally David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy
So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (1983).
31. See Marmor et al., America's Misunderstood Welfare State: Persistent
Myths, Enduring Realities 47-48 (1990) (noting widespread public support for the
Medicare, Food Stamp and Social Security programs). See generally Wallace C.
Peterson, Silent Depression: The Fate of the American Dream (1994) (describing
the paradox of a growing economy and increasing hardships for most of the
population).
32. Hitting the Middle Class, Again, N.Y. Times, May 3, 2005, at A24.
33. See, e.g., Salem et al., Parent Education as a Distinct Field of Practice:
The Agenda for the Future, 34 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. 9,13 (1996). Parent
education courses generally focus on teaching parents communication skills that
reflect acceptance of the child, build self-esteem, promote independence and reduce
conflict between parents and children. See, e.g., Thomas Gordon, Parent
Effectiveness Training: The "No-Lose" Program for Raising Responsible Children
(1970); Philip Osborne, Parenting for the 90s (1989); Rudolf Dreikurs, The
Challenge of Parenthood (1991) (arguing children must be taught to respect order
and accept social rules; conflict with children should be avoided, and children need
constant encouragement to develop self-confidence and self-reliance).
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These views roughly correspond to general views on the
appropriate role of the State, with some important caveats. The
crucial points here are: 1) that negative and positive rights are
interdependent, and neither means much without the other; 2) that
changing hearts and minds is contingent upon the satisfaction of basic
needs, which are not assured under existing American law; and 3)
that models that work for adults do not necessarily work for children.
Nor can the adult models simply be "scaled down." Because
"autonomy" has a different meaning for children, for example,
negative rights, or freedom from governmvent interference, similarly
has a different meaning. Negative rights may in fact simply leave
children at the mercy of parents who abuse or neglect them.
A. Negative Rights
The notion of family privacy, and the distinct but related notion
of deference to parental autonomy,34 has historically served as a
check on State intervention. The caveat here is the recognition that
State non-interference, freedom from State intrusion, may in fact
reinforce and perpetuate power inequalities within the family. Thus,
as feminists have long noted, "family privacy" has historically
supported the privileges of the husband and father, at the expense of
his wife and children.35 Children, especially young children, may be
particularly vulnerable, moreover, because of their complete physical
and financial dependency on adults.
The State, accordingly, has historically intervened where
necessary to protect the child.3 6 While some scholars, such as
Professor Roberts, have criticized the State for being too willing to
take children away from their families and their communities, others
have criticized the State for failing to intervene until it is too late. In
the frequently criticized case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County
34. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,43 S. Ct. 625 (1923) (holding
that parents could have their children taught German in school notwithstanding state
statute prohibiting such instruction); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510,534, 45 S. Ct. 571, 573 (1925) (parents
have a liberty interest in directing the "upbringing and education of children under
their control"). These cases have generated substantial commentary, including the
groundbreaking critique, Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child? ":
Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1972).
35. See Barbara Stark, Deconstructing the Framers' Right to Property:
Liberty's Daughters and Economic Rights, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 963, 1015 et. seq.(2000). See generally Mary Beth Norton, FoundingMothers andFathers: Gendered
Power and the Forming of American Society (1996); U.S. History as Women's
History: New Feminist Essays (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds., 1995).
36. But see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982) (holding
that parents' rights in their natural child cannot be terminated by the State without
clear and convincing evidence).
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Dept. of Social Services,37 for example, the Supreme Court held that
the State could not be held liable for failing to remove Joshua
DeShaney from the custody of his abusive father until the boy was
permanently injured and required institutionalization. Although
DeShaney sparked a national debate,38 the problems continue.
Indeed, many commentators suggest that they have grown worse.
In other areas, there has been a gradual, grudging recognition that
the State must intervene, at least in divorce. The assumption that
fathers will support their children after divorce, for example, has
been recognized as a fallacy.39 In response, the Family Support Act
of 198840 was enacted. It requires all states to enact legally-binding
child support guidelines. This is a far cry, however, from the child
support assurance of other Western democracies, which guarantee the
custodial parent essential support, whether or not the other parent
contributes.41
B. Positive Rights
Positive rights in the context of the protection of children refer
generally to affirmative obligations assumed by the State for the
children's benefit. Internationally, in addition to State assurance of
child support, noted above, this includes programs like free universal
pre-school in France and health care for children as part of
comprehensive national health care systems.42
In the United States, in contrast, children at best have a right to
the standard of living their parents can provide. As Marsha Garrison
and others have noted, child support remains inadequate,
notwithstanding the guidelines. 43  Thus, children of divorce, in
37. 489 U.S. 189, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
38. See, e.g., Affirmative Constitutional Obligations of Government Officials,
The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 167 (1989); Patricia M. Wald,
Government Benefits: A New Look at an Old Gifthorse, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 247
(1990). For a defense of the much-criticized decision, see Barbara Armacost,
Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process Clause, 94 Mich. L. Rev.
982 (1996).
39. See, e.g., Ira Ellman et al, Family Law 576-80 (1998).
40. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343.
41. Barbara Stark, International Family Law: An Introduction (Ashgate 2005).
42. Jobcentre Plus, Living and Working in France, available at
http://www.j obcentreplus.gov.uk/cms.asp?Page=/Home/Customers/WorkingOrT
raininglnE.htm (last visited 7/5/2005) (noting that 100% French five year olds
attend pre-school, most (85%) in free public institutions). See also Joan Williams,
Our Economy of Mothers and Others: Women and Economics Revisited, 5 J.
Gender, Race and Justice 411 (2002) (noting that, "The U.S. stands virtually alone
among developed nations in its conviction that child rearing is a private frolic rather
than a social enterprise of vital importance.").
43. See generally Marsha Garrison, Child Support Symposium, Child Support
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general, are more likely to need some kind of supplemental support,
some kind of safety net, than children in intact families. But children
who have never been part of an intact family are likely to need such
support even more. 44
A major argument against economic rights in the United States is
that they will encourage dependency.45 This argument has little force
as applied to children, however, because children are dependent in
any case. The only question is whether they should be penalized by
being denied basic economic rights because their parents are unable
to assure them.
The argument that the cost to society of providing such rights is
prohibitive, similarly, is unpersuasive in this context. The investment
in future, productive citizens is most justifiable the earlier it is made,
as proponents of the Headstart program have amply demonstrated.46
C. Changing Hearts and Minds
Many of the excellent papers included in this Symposium focus
on more constructive approaches to the divorce process itself. These
include models for collaborative divorce,47 proposals for defusing
high conflict divorce,48 and a range of creative interventions intended
Policy: Guidelines and Goals, 33 Fam. L.Q. 157(1999); see also Marsha Garrison,
An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 Cal L. Rev. 41 (1998).
44. I have described elsewhere how the financial burdens of nurturing work
disadvantages American women across the board. This includes, but is not limited
to, their disproportionate assumption of responsibility for their minor children. See,
e.g., Barbara Stark, International Human Rights Law, Feminist Jurisprudence, and
Nietzsche's "Eternal Return": Turning the Wheel, 19 Harv. Women's L.J. 169,
176-77 (1996); Barbara Stark, Nurturing Rights: An Essay on Women, Peace, and
International Human Rights, 13 Mich. J. Int'l L. 144 (1991).
45. The rhetoric against economic rights in the U.S. has a long and colorful
history. See, e.g., Stark, Postmodern Rhetoric, supra note 30. Other arguments,
none of which are entirely specious, include: that economic rights are a communist
plot, that Americans do not need them because of our unique opportunities, and that
they perpetuate poverty.
46. The basic argument is that early intervention avoids later expenses. See,
e.g., Peter A. Greenwood et al., Diverting Children From A Life of Crime:
Measuring Costs and Benefits (1998) (estimating costs and benefits of early
interventions for children at risk). A recent, and alarming, twist is the growing
evidence that the sky-rocketing costs of prisons in the U.S. are in fact resulting in
reduced spending on education. See, e.g., Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice,
From Classrooms to Cell Blocks: A National Perspective (2002) available at
www.cjcj.org/pubs/higher.national.html.
47. See, e.g., Julie MacFarlane, Will Changing the Process Change the
Outcome?, 65 La. L. Rev. 1487 (2005).
48. Robert Emery, Long Term Outcomes MediatedandLitigated Child Custody
Disputes, RandomizedResearch and Non Random Reflections (2005) (on file with
the Louisiana Law Review).
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to make the process less traumatic for all of the parties, especially the
children.
There is no question that such interventions can be effective and
even transformative.49 Indeed, the groundbreaking Report of the
California Commission on No-Fault Divorce, widely regarded as the
opening salvo of the no-fault divorce revolution,5 ° explicitly called
for a support staff of counselors, including psychologists and social
workers, to assist in the work of the new family court system.5'
To the extent such approaches are mandatory, i.e., legally
enforceable, however, they contemplate a very different role for the
State. This raises several intriguing issues in this context, including
the ethical obligation of a lawyer to zealously represent her client, the
potential for reinforcing power imbalances between the parties, and
the legality and appropriateness of delegating judicial responsibilities
to mental health professionals, most of which are beyond the scope
of this paper.52 For present purposes, however, the issue is whether
parental priorities should be trumped by State priorities, specifically
the State interest in reducing conflict at divorce for the protection of
children.
As I have explained at length elsewhere, parents, especially
mothers, may well have other priorities, and there may be good
reasons for deferring to them.53 From a human rights perspective, the
critical point here is simply that changing hearts and minds requires
resources. Dr. Susan Gamache pointed out that the model of
collaborative divorce developed by her and her colleagues was no
more expensive than litigation, at least for those with national health
care. 4 But we do not have national health care in the United States.
The interventions described in this Symposium arguably merit State
support under several human rights instruments, including the CRC
and the Economic Covenant," requiring the State to protect the
49. In a related context, Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has described how the
simple visit of a home nurse to the homes of newborns made a significant
difference in the quality ofparenting. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Home Visiting
and Family Values: The Powers of Conversation, Touching and Soap, 143 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 253 (1994).
50. Ira Ellman et al., Family Law, 198-99 (3d ed. 1998)
51. This part of the Committee's recommendation was defeated. Id.
52. See, e.g., Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language,
andLegal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727 (1988).
53. Barbara Stark, Guys and Dolls: Remedial Nurturing Skills in Post-Divorce
Practice, Feminist Theory, and Family Law Doctrines, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 293
(1997).
54. Susan Gamache, Ph.D., Collaborative Practice A New Opportunity to
Address Children's Best Interest in Divorce, 65 La. L. Rev. 1455 (2005).
55. See infra Part IV.
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family and promote its development, but the United States is not a
party to these instruments.
In sum, changing hearts and minds assumes the enjoyment of
basic human rights. This mode necessarily contains negative and
positive elements. That is, there must be some recognition of
negative rights, of family privacy and autonomy, including children's
privacy and autonomy. At the same time, positive rights must be
recognized, because State support may well be critical, especially for
single parent families in poverty. But these rights cannot be assumed
in the United States. While this might not be an issue for the
relatively affluent, for the law to ignore it perpetuates and
exacerbates the dual system of family law decried by tenBroek.56
Reducing conflict at divorce will certainly benefit some children.
The approaches which the participants developed for doing so surely
can and should be made more widely available. The point remains,
however, that most of these proposals are simply not options for poor
children and their parents. Indeed, reforms focused on divorce are for
the most part irrelevant to their lives. If the focus is truly "the
protection of children," we cannot forget those parents who will
never divorce, because they never believed that marriage would be
their ticket to a better life.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK-THE CRC
A. How It Would Help
1. A Well-Established Legal Framework
Human rights law is a powerful and growing international system
of treaties and customs-an emerging global consensus. More than
180 states have ratified the Civil Covenant, the Economic Covenant,
the Women's Convention, and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.57 By incorporating human rights law, domestic law accedes
to an international bottom line. Domestic law incorporating human
rights norms, accordingly, is likely to be compatible with a broad
range of foreign law similarly incorporating these norms. As a
56. See generally tenBroek, supra note 2.
57. Louis Henkin et al., Basic Document Supplement to International Law
Cases and Materials 151 (Civil Covenant), 146 (Economic Covenant), 174
(Women's Convention), 188 (Convention on the Rights ofthe Child) (3d ed. 1993).
In 1948, when the Universal Declaration was adopted, there were only 56 States
parties. 48 States voted in favor of the Universal Declaration, none opposed and
8 abstained. Id. at 143. The Child's Convention has been ratified by 192 States.
Available at http://www.uniceforg/crc/crc.htm.
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corollary, it is increasingly likely to resonate for growing numbers of
an increasingly mobile population.
Human rights law is grounded in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights drafted in 1948.58 But the Universal Declaration was
merely aspirational; the parties did not intend it to be legally
binding.59 Rather, it represented a rough consensus, an inchoate
commitment to the idea of human rights. Under the Universal
Declaration, for example, States parties recognized that, "The family
is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to
protection by society and the State."6  The more contentious
questions of how "family" was to be defined, and the precise kind
and scope of "protections" to which it was entitled, were left for
another day. It was expected that a binding convention would be
drafted and a committee was formed for that purpose. The idea was
abandoned because of the Cold War, the East/West split, and the
emerging consensus that different kinds of rights could be better
implemented by different mechanisms. Instead of one legally-
binding convention, there were two, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (the "Civil Covenant")6' and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the
"Economic Covenant").62 Together with the Universal Declaration,
these comprise the International Bill of Rights.
There is some overlap between the two covenants. For example,
Article 23 of the Civil Covenant expressly reiterates the State's
obligation to protect the family as "the natural and fundamental
group unit of society" as set out in the Universal Declaration.63
Article 10 of the Economic Covenant, similarly, provides, "The
widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the
family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society,
particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the
care and education of dependent children." This arguably requires
the State to enact laws protecting vulnerable parties, especially
women and children.
58. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
59. Many argue that many of the provisions set out in the Universal
Declaration have since become binding as a matter of customary international law.
Henkin et al., supra note 57, at 322.
60. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 16.3.
61. 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976).
62. 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1976).
63. Article 15.3 of the Universal Declaration provides, "The family is the
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by the
society and the State." Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 15.3.
64. Declaration offHuman Rights, supra note 58, art. 10 (Economic Covenant).
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For the most part, however, the Civil Covenant addresses
negative obligations of the State; that is, it imposes limits on State
interference with individuals. The Economic Covenant, in contrast,
basically addresses affirmative obligations of the State, including the
provision of welfare and social security benefits. The Economic
Covenant requires the State to affirmatively assure its people an
adequate standard of living, healthcare, education, and employment.
In Article 10 of the Economic Covenant, for example, the States
parties recognize that mothers are entitled to "special protection"
before and after childbirth, including paid leave.65 Thus, a State party
would be required to incorporate into domestic law either welfare
provisions assuring compensation or a requirement that private
employers do so.
Even if the United States refuses to ratify the CRC, it can be
drawn upon for the protection of children.66 International human
rights norms have been adopted in a broad range of contexts to
provide normative guidance, from adoption by municipalities (such
as San Francisco) and States (such as Massachusetts) to signal
support for human rights,67 to the adoption by multinational
corporations of Model Codes of Conduct, both to signal support for
human rights and, it has been suggested, to pre-empt binding
regulation. Even if particular human rights instruments are not
ratified or acceded to by the State, in short, they may be relied upon
as non-binding "soft law." The Sullivan Principles in South Africa
are a well-known example of the use of soft law to promote human
rights.68
The CRC includes both civil (political) and socio-economic
rights. Although the earlier treaties arguably include "children"
within their ambit of protection, the CRC "focuses on children as
right bearers, not simply as objects of protection." '69
2. Protect More Children
The CRC does not privilege children of married, or divorced,
parents over other children. Rather, its protections are universally
65. Id.
66. The U.S. is not a party to the Economic Covenant or the Women's
Convention, although it has signed both. However, neither of these treaties have
been ratified by the Senate. Henkin et al., supra note 57 at 784.
67. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 120 S. Ct.
2288 (2000) (holding Burma law of Massachusetts invalid under the Supremacy
Clause).
68. See generally Sanctions Against Apartheid (Mark Orkin ed., 1989).
69. Susan Kilbourne, Placing the Convention on the Rights of the Child in
American Context, 26 Hum. Rts. 27 (1999).
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extended to all children. Thus, its approach is more like that of
general entitlement programs, such as Social Security, than means-
tested programs, such as welfare. General programs, unlike means-
tested programs, carry no stigma. As a corollary, in this context the
approach of the CRC would undermine the bifurcated system of
family law described by tenBroek.7 °
3. At Greater Risk
The CRC would provide better protection for the children at
greatest risk because it was drafted for precisely that purpose. It
explicitly addresses the economic rights which those children so
conspicuously lack. Equally important, it identifies them as
rightholders, as active subjects, as players in the game, not pawns.
It may even be better for children of divorce. The focus on
divorce may well exacerbate the risks facing children of divorce
themselves. Leading experts in the area, for example, have focused
on the risks to children posed by their warring parents. Andrew
Schepard founded the P.E.A.C.E. project to educate parents regarding
the harm they caused their children by treating them as pawns in
divorce.7' June Carbone has aptly described custody battles as
"ground zero in the gender wars."72
It would benefit children of divorce to re-situate this argument,
from the context of divorce, a proceeding in which they are not even
parties, to the context of human rights, where they are recognized as
subjects and as rights holders. The CRC explicitly addresses the
child's situation at divorce in two of the four articles that are
generally referred to as "general principles:" 1) "the child's right to
be heard in matters affecting him or her" and 2) the "best interest of
the child" standard.73 Under the CRC, however, these are a child's
rights, independent of divorce. They are owed to each child, by the
State, regardless of the parent's marital status.
The child's "right to be heard" is not dependent on the strategy of
the parent's divorce lawyer; it is an ongoing right of the child. This
is a crucial move and its significance is reflected in the growing
number of children's advocates who have shifted the focus from
domestic family law to the more far-reaching protections of
international human rights law. As Barbara Bennett Woodhouse
notes:
70. See tenBroek, supra note 2.
71. Andrew Schepard, Planning for P.E.A. C.E.: The Development of Court
ConnectedEducation Programsfor Divorcing andSeparating Families, 23 Hofstra
L. Rev. 845 (1995).
72. June Carbone, From Partners to Parents (2000).
73. Kilbourne, American Context, supra note 69, at 27.
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Americans tend to sort children into two categories. There are
"our own children" and "other people's children." Our children
are coddled and spoiled by adoring parents .... Other people's
children, especially if they are inner city children of color, are
predatory monsters and are totally out of control .... This
divide between our children and other people's children is an
illusion. It ignores a fundamental tenet of human rights: All
people are my brothers and sisters, parents and children.74
Perhaps more telling is the astonishing energy conservative
groups-the same groups that have been the most vocal defenders of
"famil values" in the divorce context-have expended in targeting the
CRC.75 They understand that recognizing children's voices, however
problematic, is a step away from control by the churches.
B. Necessary But Not Sufficient
Ratification, and implementation, of the CRC is necessary for the
protection of American children, but it is not sufficient. Remember the
kittens? Children cannot be protected if their mothers are left to drown.
Thus, ratification of the CRC would be a start, but ratification of the rest
of the International Bill of Rights, along with the Women's Convention,
should follow. As Janet Giele has pointed out:
[F]eminists note that divorce, lone-mother families, and
women's employment is on the rise in every industrialized
nation. But other countries have not seen the same devastating
decline in child well-being, teen pregnancy, suicides and violent
deaths, school failure and a rising population of children in
poverty. The other countries have four key elements of social
and family policy which protect all children and their mothers:
"(1) work guarantees and other economic supports; (2) child
care; (3) health care; (4) housing subsidies."76
74. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Symposium, Keynote, Legal Reform and
Children's Human Rights, 14 St. John's J., 331 (2000); Symposium, The
Constitutionalization of Children's Rights: Incorporating Emerging Human Rights
into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1 (1999).
75. See, e.g., Alison Dundes Renteln, Who 's Afraid of the CRC. Objections to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 3 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 629 (1997);
Susan Kilbourne, U.S. Failure to Ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Playing Politics with Children 's Rights, 6 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 437
(1996).
76. Janet Z. Giele, Decline of the Family: Conservative, Liberal and Feminist
Views, reprinted in Margaret Brinig et al., Family Law in Action 28-29 (1999).
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Feminist economists77 and others,78 similarly, have linked women's
economic subordination to women's nurturing work-the mostly unpaid
cooking, cleaning, feeding, clothing, and general housekeeping work
they do for the children and men with whom they live. Women are the
major source of unremunerated nurturing work at every income level of
American society.79 Nurturing work is so deeply internalized that
women do it unconsciously and so deeply embedded in the culture that
no one sees them doing it. Nurturing work remains "women's work"
that is not only unpaid but also unrecognized by the market. As a result,
not only do women work an uncompensated "second shift,"8 ° but a
market structure that refuses to recognize other demands on women's
time limits women's access to better-paying, higher-status jobs.81
Nurturing work is not the only cause of women's poverty, but it is
almost always a substantial factor. 2 The notoriously low wages for paid
nurturing work, such as childcare or nursing, leave many of the women
in these fields hovering dangerously near the poverty line.83 Because of
their unpaid nurturing work at home, moreover, women earn
substantially less than men, and their attachment to the labor force is
weaker." While the majority of women are not poor, the majority of the
poor are women.85 Even those who are not currently poor are far more
likely to have been poor and to become poor than are men. Women are
the most economically vulnerable if they become sick and when they
become old.86
Law that spreads the cost of nurturing work is already recognized as
part of international human rights law. The Economic Covenant
77. See, e.g., Marilyn Waring, If Women counted: A New Feminist Economics
(1988).
78. See, e.g., Martha A. Fineman, The Concept of the Natural Family and the
Limits ofAmerican Family Law, 4 Int'l Rev. Comp. Pub. Pol'y 15 (1992).
79. See Arlie Hochschild & Anne Machung, The Second Shift: Working
Parents and the Revolution At Home 8 (1989).
80. Id.
81. See Victor R. Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equality4 (1988). See
generally Alice Kessler-Harris, A Woman's Wage: Historical Meanings and Social
Consequences (1990).
82. Fuchs, supra note 81, at 58passim.
83. For a chart showing occupations primarily held by women and their median
weekly pay in comparison with men in the same occupation, see Peter T. Kilbom,
More Women Take Low- Wage Jobs Just So Their Families Can Get By, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 13, 1994, § 1, at 24.
84. Fuchs, supra note 81, at 58-74.
85. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Poverty in the United
States: 1992, 60-185 T.5 (1992).
86. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the
median income of widowed women over sixty is $6,300, compared to $26,202 for
retired couples in their late sixties. Doris Wild Helmering, Economics ofRetiring:
He Says Yes, She Says No, Knoxville News-Sentinel, May 27, 1995, at B.
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recognizes the right of every human being to be nurtured-to be housed,
fed, clothed, healed, and educated. These "nurturing rights" are inverted
descriptions of women's work, what American women actually do. I am
not suggesting complete congruence, a perfect fit. Women obviously do
not, and could not, assume sole responsibility for assuring all of the
rights set forth in the Economic Covenant. 7 Nevertheless, the overlap
where women's work satisfies obligations imposed by the Economic
Covenant is substantial. By requiring States to "take steps to
progressively realize" nurturing rights, the Economic Covenant shifts
rcsponsibility from women to the State for nuturing work. The
Women's Convention goes even further, requiring States to recognize
"all forms of discrimination against women," including culturally
determined conceptions of "work."88
By linking nurturing rights to legal entitlements, and explicitly
requiring States to "recognize" them, the Economic Covenant also
makes women's work more visible, less women's personal concern, and
more a subject for public debate. Ratification of the Economic Covenant
would trigger and support a national discussion of women's work.
VI. CONCLUSION
The CRC is hardly a panacea. As critics have noted, its almost
universal ratification is matched by its almost universal unenforceability.
It is more rhetorical than legal; it is more public relations than art. But
these are stormy times, and children are drowning. The CRC has its
problems, and its application in an American context remains an open
and profoundly controversial question. But international human rights
lawyers have shown that the CRC offers some protection for children in
a surprisingly broad range of contexts. 9 In the hands of children's
advocates like the participants in this Symposium, it could certainly
provide some shelter for American children, including American
children of divorce.
87. For a scholarly collection of papers analyzing household resource
distribution issues from the perspectives of anthropology, economics, and
psychology, see Intra-Household Resource Allocation: Issues and Methods for
Development and Planning (Beatrice L. Rogers & Nina P. Schlossman eds., 1990).
88. As Marilyn Waring observes, "[I]t seems to me that one ofthe most glaring
tools of continual enslavement of more than half of the human species finds its
focus in the inadequate international patriarchal concept of 'work. "' Waring, supra
note 77, at 182.
89. See, e.g., L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Rhetoric or Rights?: When Culture and
Religion Bar Girls'Right to Education, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 1073 (explaining how the
CRC assures a right to education); Barbara Stark, Lost Boys and Forgotten Girls:
African Refugees, Adoption, and International Human Rights Law, 22 St. Louis U.
Pub. L. Rev. 275 (2003) (explaining how the CRC affects adoption).
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APPENDIX A
Table 1
Low-Income
Outcomes Children's Higher Risk
Health
Death in infancy 1.6 times as likely
Premature birth (under 37 weeks) 1.8 times as likely
Low birth weight 1.9 times as likely
No regular source of health care 2.7 times as likely
Inadequate prenatal care 2.8 times as likely
Family had too little food sometime in 8 times as likely
the last 4 months
Table 2
Low-Income
Outcomes Children's Higher Risk
Education
Math scores at ages 7 to 8 5 test points lower
Reading scores at ages 7 to 8 4 test points lower
Repeated a grade 2.0 times as likely
Expelled from school 3.4 times as likely
Being a dropout at ages 16 to 24 3.5 times as likely
Finishing a four-year college Half as likely
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